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In this article, I argue that at the root of the ‘ontological’ argument
lies the notion that the idea of God is truth: in the idea of God,
the meaning of the concept and the reality of the Being actually
converge; the idea of God is God. After looking at a number of
thinkers whose philosophical method is reminiscent of Anselm’s I
conclude that, while Anselm did not furnish a conclusive proof of
the necessary existence of God, his argument shows how the question
of the existence of God is one and the same with the question of
the intelligibility and coherence of God and with the question of the
intelligibility and coherence of reality.
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The celebrated argument, particularly as put forth in Chapter II of
the Proslogion has given rise to a greater volume of philosophical
effort than perhaps any other single argument.1 In this so-called ‘On-
tological’ Argument,2 the mediaeval philosopher maintains that the
1 See Robert Brecher, Anselm’s Argument: The Logic of Divine Existence, Hants:
Aldershot, 1986, 3. See also Ian Logan, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion, (Ashgate 2009),
p. 1. In this article, I will not deal with the issue of the difference in the arguments
presented in Chapter II and in Chapter III of the Proslogion as outlined by Norman Mal-
colm (‘Anselm’s Ontological Arguments’, The Philosophical Review, 69 [1960] pp. 41–62)
and Charles Hartshorne (‘What did Anselm Discover’, Union Seminary Quarterly Review
17 [1962] pp. 213–222) respectively (see John Hick– Arthur McGill, The Many-Faced
Argument [London: Macmillan, 1968], pp. 301–333).
2 The argument was not originally called so. The term ‘ontological argument’ was
coined by Immanuel Kant. For Anselm’s argument, see Proslogion II-IV and Anselm of
Canterbury’s Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonnem respondentem pro Insipiente replying
to the objection raised by Gaunilon of Marmoutier. (See Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion:
St. Anselm’s Proslogion, translated with an introduction and philosophical commentary by
M.J. Charlesworth, [Oxford: Clarendon, 1965].)
C© 2011 The Author. New Blackfriars C© 2011 The Dominican Council. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2011, 9600 Garsington
Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden MA 02148, USA
Anselm’s Argument: On the Unity of Thinking and Being 277
existence of the notion of God in thought would be impossible if
God did not exist really. In this article, I shall argue that at the root
of this argument lies the notion that the idea of God is truth: in the
idea of God, the meaning of the concept and the reality of the Being
actually converge; the idea of God is God.
In both his treatises (the Monologion and the Proslogion), Anselm
maintains that the nature of God is ultimately unknowable to man. In
the Proslogion, in particular, he reiterates the inaccessibility of God
and the indirectness of any perception of his nature.3 He uses the
analogy of the sun and the eye to describe the relationship between
God and the mind. One cannot look upon the sun itself but only
on other things reflecting the sun’s rays of light.4 Anselm insists,
with others, that we can know God only in the light of the truth,
which is God.5 Thus the discussions of the divine attributes in both
treatises, particularly in the Proslogion, are attempts to ‘grasp’ the
divine nature as it shows itself in things dependent on it. Chapters
II-IV of the Proslogion are to be taken separately from the rest of
his work, for they deal with the being of God (that he exists) rather
than the manner of his existence.6
Anselm is a Platonic thinker7 and his argument is only cogent
within his Platonic framework. First in the Proslogion, and later in
his reply to the objections of Gaunilon, Anselm argued from the idea
of God to the existence of such a being. In a real sense his whole
3 This feature of the Proslogion can be seen in the very statement naming God as ‘id
quo maius cogitari nequit’. (See Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion III: St. Anselm’s Proslo-
gion, translated with an introduction and philosophical commentary by M.J. Charlesworth,
[Oxford: Clarendon, 1965], p. 118.)
4 See Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion XVI : St. Anselm’s Proslogion, translated with
an introduction and philosophical commentary by M.J. Charlesworth, [Oxford: Clarendon,
1965], pp. 136–137.)
5 See Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio II, 12, 34; 15, 39 : (= Nuova Biblioteca
Agostiniana III/2) introduced and translated and annotated by Domenico Gentili, (Roma:
Citta` Nuova Editrice, 1987), pp. 255–257; 261–263. It is typical that thinkers such as
Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Duns Scotus and others, who hold the doctrine of divine
illumination, accept Anselm’s argument. Idealist thinkers of the post-Enlightenment age
such as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel and others, also accept his argument, although
they re-formulate it in their own fashion.
6 Anselm clearly distinguishes between the understanding of God ‘that he is as we
believe’ (‘esse sicut credimus’) and ‘that he is what we believe him to be’ (‘hoc esse quod
credimus’). (See Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion II : St. Anselm’s Proslogion, trans-
lated with an introduction and philosophical commentary by M.J. Charlesworth, [Oxford:
Clarendon, 1965], pp. 116–117.)
7 The ‘ontological’ argument is Platonic, not because it relies on the content of Plato’s
Theory of Forms, but because it relies on that theory’s form. God and the ‘Good’ oc-
cupy similar positions at the summit of a hierarchical system, the nature of which they
(respectively) determine. The point is that the Judeo-Christian God must have something
in common with the rest of the hierarchy, his creation, in order to be the most real entity
possible. (See Robert Brecher, Anselm’s Argument: The Logic of Divine Existence, [Hants:
Aldershot, 1986], p. 67.)
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argument hinges on the definition Anselm uses for God: ‘aliquid quo
nihil maius cogitari possit’,8 a definition partly inspired by Augustine
who had characterized God as that “than which there is nothing
higher”.9
The argument is meant to give voice to the ontological connection
between God and man, that is the image of God in the interior of
man, where the reality of God directly manifests itself. The idea of
God is innate in man as the image of God; thinking can therefore be
radically directed beyond itself.
Anselm holds that ideas are themselves things and for them to
be is an indication of something concerning the nature of things.
For him, thinking is a participation in being and an interpretation of
being. The ‘ontological’ proof itself only holds in the case of God
because God is that single being on which all thought, all action, and
all being depend. Normally, the idea of no part of being would imply
the existence of that part. Yet, if thought is itself being, the existence
of thought would warrant the assertion of the existence of Being as a
whole. As they approach their source, ideas and beings are identical,
since the eternal ideas that may be experienced in thinking are the
principles of Being.10
8 At the beginning of the Proslogion II, where it appears for the first time, this name is
rendered by the words: ‘aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit’. The actual formulation is
not fixed either in the Proslogion itself, nor in the ‘Reply’ to Gaunilon: instead of aliquid,
Anselm also says id; he sometimes omits the pronoun; he at times replaces possit by potest
or even by valet; he occasionally replaces nihil (or non) . . . possit by nequit and also,
quite frequently, uses maius or melius interchangeably. The phrases are quite similar and
he seems to regard them as synonymous.
9
“Quo nihil superius”. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio II, 6, 14 : (= Nuova Biblioteca
Agostiniana III/2) introduced and translated and annotated by Domenico Gentili, (Roma:
Citta` Nuova Editrice, 1987), p. 230.
10 See Selections from Mediaeval Philosophers, I/Augustine to Albert the Great, edited
and translated with introductory notes by Richard McKeon, (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1929), pp. 147–148. Anselm’s argument was largely neglected during the remainder
of the Medieval Period due to its having been rejected by Aquinas in favour of the
Cosmological Argument. However, in the seventeenth century, it was again brought into
prominence by Descartes who made explicit the presupposition of the argument; that
existence is an attribute or predicate which like other predicates, a given x can meaningfully
be said to have or to lack. He argues that just as the idea of a triangle necessarily
includes among the defining attributes of a triangle that of having its three internal angles
equal to two right angles so the idea of a supremely perfect Being necessarily includes
the attribute of existence. Therefore, we can no more think without contradiction of a
supremely perfect Being which lacks existence than of a triangle which does not have
three sides. Descartes then considers the objection that from the fact that in order to
be a triangle a figure must have three sides, it does not follow that triangles exist; and
likewise in the case of a supremely perfect Being. His reply is that whereas the notion
(or essence) of a triangle does not include the attribute of existence, that of a supremely
perfect Being does. Therefore in this case alone, we are able to infer existence from a
concept.
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Karl Barth’s re-reading of Anselm’s argument, while typical of one
who is averse to natural theology, is illuminating.11 He holds that the
Anselmian proof shows that, according to the testimony of his own
revelation, God has the freedom to prove his existence within the
reality that is distinct of him.12 He sees the argument as nothing
other than a repetition of the self-proof of God.13
Charles Hartshorne, whose publication in 1965 helped spark off a
spate of works on the argument,14 sees Anselm’s discovery as being
the claim that both believers who lack understanding and unbelievers
clearly do not know the meaning of belief in God.15 His formulation
of Anselm’s ‘aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit’ is ‘that than
which no greater can be thought’. This entails that it is contradictory
to assert that God does not exist. The question of the existence of God
is a self-answering metaphysical one: although it involves a matter of
fact and not merely of formal definition, its answer is seen as soon
as the idea contained in it is correctly understood. One, therefore,
does not need experience to confirm or deny God’s existence.
Anselm proved the existence of God from the fact that God has
proved himself and continues to do so by setting himself as the be-
ginning beyond which thinking cannot go and with which all thinking
must begin. Here, the Anselmian formula does not intend to say that
we can first understand what the sentence means and then set about
to determine whether there is anything corresponding to it; thinking
11 Both Anselm and Barth would agree that it is through God’s light and truth that
understanding is possible at all; even the understanding of the Fool is a gift of God, whether
he acknowledges it or not. Where they differ radically is in their epistemology: in Barth’s
case, but not in Anselm’s, epistemology is grounded in Christian faith. Barth implies that
knowledge of God, which is possible only for those who believe in God, is a necessary
condition of true knowledge of anything at all. (See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1,
edited by G.W. Bromiley – T.F. Torrance, [Edinburgh 1956], p. 148.) Anselm holds that
certain things about God can be known by anyone. Whereas Barth thinks that the Fool
can, without inconsistency, continue to think as he does (for he is an insipiens and as
such thinks on a level where one can only think falsely; though without violating the inner
consistency of that level – see Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, [Pittsburgh:
Pickwick Press, 1975], p. 165), Anselm’s argument is directed towards showing that the
Fool is thinking irrationally if, after having attended to and understood his argument, he
persists in his atheism.
12 See Karl Barth Church Dogmatics, II/I, edited by G.W. Bromiley – T.F. Torrance,
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), p. 304.
13 See Ibid., pp. 304–305.
14 The initial impetus to the re-ignited interest in the ‘Ontological’ Argument was
provided by Norman Malcolm, the celebrated disciple and biographer of Wittgenstein. One
may criticize Hartshorne’s ‘relocation’ of the ontological argument in Chapter III (of the
Proslogion) and his regard of the argument in Chapter II as only a poor first attempt.
In effect, Hartshorne is accused by some authors (like Brecher himself) of foisting on to
Anselm an argument that is not his own. (See Robert Brecher, Anselm’s Argument: The
Logic of Divine Existence, [Hants: Aldershot, 1986], pp. 3–4.)
15 See Charles Hartshorne, Anselm’s Discovery: A Re-examination of the Ontological
Proof for God’s Existence, (La Salle/IL: Open Court, 1965), p. 97.
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along such a plane would be to imitate the insipiens. One can here
refer to Anselm’s own description, where he claims that it is one
thing to think a reality (res) by thinking the vocable (vox) that sig-
nifies it; it is quite another thing to think a reality by understanding
the very thing that the reality is.16
Anselm’s position here is surely reminiscent (only of course, it is
the other way round) of that of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was
inspired by the famous poem penned by Parmenides, who found it
impossible to deny that the world around us possesses some elements
of truth, even if they are mingled with falsehood. Perhaps the most
famous line in that poem is the one which is the most difficult
to translate.17 Attempted translations have been: “is and cannot not
be” and “is not and needs must not be”. The translation proferred
by Heidegger is interesting and axiomatic to his philosophic system:
‘Being and the thinking of Being are the same’. His aim was to “work
out the question of the meaning of Being; . . .. [his] provisional aim
[was] the interpretation of time as the horizon within which any
understanding whatever of Being is possible”.18
He denied that there are any ‘eternal truths’, holding that this
contention belongs to the residues of Christian theology in philo-
sophical thought,19 and attempted to establish the original meaning
of the word. True to form, he appealed to the use of the etymology
of the term to help him in this regard. He took up the Greek word
a-letheia, a privative expression, meaning ‘uncoveredness’ or ‘uncon-
cealment’ to argue that truth is the sense of coming to light: the truth
of something is its having been brought out of a state of obscurity
and forgetfulness into a state of notice and recall. A true statement
is, therefore, one that is true in the sense of aletheuein: it clears and
reveals; it lets something stand out.20 Thus, we attain the truth when
16
“aliter enim cogitatur, aliter cum id ipsum quod res est intelligitur” (Anselm
of Canterbury, Proslogion iv : St. Anselm’s Proslogion, translated with an introduc-
tion and philosophical commentary by M.J. Charlesworth, [Oxford: Clarendon, 1965],
p. 120).
17 The Greek original reads: “TO AP AYTO NOEIN ETIN TE KAI EINAI” (DK
28 B 3. See Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 440, 12; Plotinus Enneads 5, 1, 8).
18 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson
(London: SCM Press, 1962), p. 19.
19 When discussing the Kantian categories, Heidegger claimed that Kant himself was
very close to abandoning belief in timeless logic and timeless categories in his first edition
of The Critique of Pure Reason. In the second edition, however, he fell back to the
traditional point of view. (See John Macquarrie, Heidegger and Christianity, [London:
SCM Press, 1994], p. 25.)
20 Schleiermacher can be said to have used the concept of ‘truth’ in this sense when
he speaks of the redemption-liberation accomplished by Jesus as a passing from a state
of God-forgetfulness to one of God-consciousness. (See Friedrich Schleiermacher, The
Christian Faith, [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke, 1989], §11, pp. 54–55.)
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something is presented to us as it really is, without any concealment
or distortion.
The centrality of the concept of Dasein in his philosophy is also
indicative. The Dasein, in which the human mind participates, is like
a clearing in which Being comes to light.21 It is a point at which
the intellectus and the res converge. Recalling Aristotle and Thomas
Aquinas,22 he defines the ‘I’ as the entity whose nature it is to come
together with every entity23 In Being and Time, Heidegger altered
the metaphysical terminology so that the act that is directed toward
Being is itself called ‘Being’ instead of ‘thinking’. ‘Thinking of’,
thus becomes ‘Being toward’ (Sein zu) in Heideggerian terminology.
Thus Dasein is nothing but the point of reflection where thinking
and Being come together. It is the remoteness of Being manifested
in the closeness of ‘here’.
At the other end of the self-to-other relation is the connectedness
of meaning and reality in all things that is seen in the experience of
truth. For Heidegger, the locus of truth is not the proposition, but the
Dasein. Truth is an event in Dasein. This does not mean that truth
is subjective, or that it can be made whatever we want it to be for
“[Man] is the more mistaken, the more exclusively he takes himself
to be the measure of all things”.24 Heidegger maintains that truth
is linked with the freedom of letting-be. Therefore, we perceive the
truth of something when we let it be what it really is.
These two dimensions of Dasein and truth are brought together
through a reflective act involving projection25 and disclosure.26 The
connection between projection and ascertainment (which derives from
disclosure) is time. Heidegger argues that truth does not have “the
structure of an agreement between cognition and object in the sense
of an assimilation (Angleichung) of one entity (subject) to another
(object)”.27 For him, making an assertion is itself a relating of oneself
21 Also, as Parmenides linked being and thought, thinking cannot fail to be a thinking
of being, and this establishes the link between Dasein and Sein. Heidegger also holds that
Dasein is a unity. He holds that: “to be sure, the constitution of the structural whole and its
everyday kind of Being is phenomenally so manifold that it can easily obstruct our looking
at the whole as such phenomenologically in a way which is unified”. (Martin Heidegger,
Being and Time, [London: SCM Press, 1962], p. 225.)
22 See Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae De Veritate I, 1 : (= Editio Sexta
Taurinensis), [Roma: Marietti, 1931], p. 3.
23 See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (Tu¨bingen: Max Niemeyer, 1963), p. 14.
24 Martin Heidegger, ‘On the Essence of Truth’, in Werner Brock Henry ed., Basic
Writings, edited by (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949), p. 316.
25 The reality indicated is projected by signs (that is, the visual or acoustic figures that
are used in spoken or written language).
26 This is the way in which the object shows itself. This makes it possible to ascertain
the reality corresponding to the projection.
27 See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (Tu¨bingen: Max Niemeyer, 1963), p. 91.
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in thought to the real thing itself;28 the projection it contains is
not that of a representation of the object but of the object itself.
Verification takes place when the thing shows itself to be in itself
the same as how it is projected, or disclosed, in the assertion. What
is between the intellectus and the res is the temporality indicated by
saying that the thing is in itself what it was in the assertion.
One might here well argue that the difficulty with this line of
thought is precisely the link between Dasein and Sein. It seems hard
to agree, with Heidegger, that thinking of being is the same as Being.
For, while one would agree that ‘“A knows that p” implies p’ could
be valid, it seems easy to disprove ‘“A thinks that p” implies p’. For
one could easily picture impossible states of affairs.29
As we have seen, Anselm too, argues that we cannot divorce the
word from the reality it permits us to understand. His presupposition
is that the name of God is not a mere word, as Gaunilon thought; it
is a word of God that also reveals his existence. The fool’s mistake
is that he did not see that the name ‘aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari
possit’30 is not merely one vocative among others but is a revelatory
word and the revealed and believed name of God.31 Anyone who
hears and understands the name ‘God’ finds himself, not merely
before a vocative, but before an actual possibility which in turn
presents thinking with its real boundaries.
Hence, Anselm’s argument is not as a prioristic and purely deduc-
tive as it seems. It is rather connected with Anselm’s own doctrine of
the image of God in the human person and is therefore close to the
teaching of various Church Fathers on the idea of God as innate in the
human person. However, as an argument, it certainly appears highly
suspect to the philosophical tradition, especially that subsequent to
Immanuel Kant. For, it is alleged that while it establishes that the
concept of God involves the idea of God’s existence, and indeed of
the concept of God as necessary existence (as it is inconceivable that
a being which exists without beginning or end and always as a whole
ceases to exist); it cannot take the further step of establishing that
this concept of an eternally existent Being is exemplified in reality.
Therefore it does not follow from the argument that an eternal being
28
“Sein zum seienden Ding selbst” (Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, [Tu¨bingen: Max
Niemeyer, 1963], p. 218).
29 I am indebted to Peter Serracino Inglott, Beginning Philosophy, (Malta: Media Cen-
tre, 1987), pp. 47–48, for the formulation of this argument.
30 This is not intended by Anselm to be a definition of the nature of God, from which
his existence is to be deduced. Instead, it formulates a rule of thinking. The point of
the argument lies in the fact that, by starting with nothing more than the rule of thought
contained in the name of God, one could arrive at the conclusion that God exists not only
in thought, but also in reality.
31 See Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press,
1975), p. 113.
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in fact exists but only that if such a being exists, its existence is
ontologically necessary.32
Barth interprets the proof put forth by Anselm as involving, not the
truth of the assertion ‘There is a God’, but the truth of the assertion
‘God is truth, that is, the unity of meaning and reality’. The unity
of meaning and reality refers to what is given in the words ‘aliquid
quo nihil maius cogitari possit’. What is shown in the proof is that
“the object designated as God cannot be thought of as being only
in the understanding”.33 Anselm conducts this proof of the existence
of God by presenting God as the only one whose existence can
be proven. He attempts to show that it is impossible to even formulate
the words ‘God may not exist’, because such an effort would violate
the rule of non-contradiction. Thus, in the words of the name ‘aliquid
quo nihil maius cogitari possit’, the referent of the name is present.
Thinking the meaning of these words is to the knowledge of God’s
existence what perceiving a physical object through the senses is to
the knowledge of mundane things.
Hence, the argument is concerned with the existence, not of just
any idea, but of the supreme idea which is required for thinking
and in which thinking transcends itself. The ontological argument is
simply a logical unfolding of the ontological constitution of reason
(ratio).
Indeed, Anselm interprets the sense of ‘God is’ through comparison
of the relation between essence or esse and existence, to that between
lux, lucere, and lucens. As ‘shining’ (lucere) is what light (lux) does
by virtue of its being light, so ‘being’ (esse) is what God does by
virtue of God’s being God. Light cannot but lucere and God cannot
but esse.
The Anselmian proof, thus, claims to show that, in the thought of
‘aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit’, we are presented with the
unity of thinking and Being; it attempts to point out a place at which
thinking cannot be separated from real Being.34 Its sense is that of
32 The term ‘ontologically’ is here used to differentiate from ‘logical necessity’ i.e.
that existence is logically true (by definition). It is certainly highly doubtful to the human
being whether a proposition asserting existence could be logically necessary i.e. whether
or not one could maintain that a given kind of entity exists if one’s argument is based only
on the rules of language.
33 Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1975),
p. 94.
34 To identify God with the name ‘id quo maius cogitari nequit’ is to make a declaration
of faith. The proof, in itself, does not show that God is the one referred to by the name.
What the proof points to, is the structure of the thinking of being. To think that than which
no greater can be thought is to be in the presence of the structure of being. We cannot
think of anything greater that the relation between self and the world (the structure of
being), because all thinking is involved in such a relation. The structure of being is that
than which nothing greater can be thought.
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an idea that is not merely such, but that opens thought on to the real
referent of thinking.
The highly original argument advanced by Anselm has not been
without its critics of whom Gaunilon was the first. The argument
was, however, dealt a virtual death-blow by Thomas Aquinas.
One argument the latter advances against Anselm is to be found
in the Summa Contra Gentiles: “For it is not a difficulty that given
anything either in reality or in the intellect something greater can be
thought, save only for him who concedes that there exists something
in reality than which a greater cannot be thought”.35 This objec-
tion, which pinpoints the impossibility of conceiving God’s great-
ness, is a serious one. However, ironically enough it is one with
which Anselm would have been in complete agreement. In Proslogion
XV he writes: “You are also something greater than can be thought”.
Anselm ‘agrees’ with Aquinas that that entity, which both take to
be the most real of all, is not knowable. In his definition ‘aliquid
quo nihil maius cogitari possit’, he does not mean to say that God
is a definite, specifiable entity within the grasp of one’s conceptual
capacity, but that God is what-ever is such that nothing greater can
be conceived. Anselm’s ontological argument seems to hold even if
we do not have a clear and distinct idea of God. All we need to
know is that God is something greater than which nothing can be
conceived.36
Through another argument, Thomas Aquinas dealt what, for many
centuries, was considered to be the coup-de-grace, to the argument.37
He recognized that Anselm was assuming that the being, to whose
existence his formula led him, was to be identified with the Christian
God. Aquinas is more conscious of the distinction between philos-
ophy and theology. As a philosopher, he uses the term ‘God’ as a
general term, and not as a proper name. While Aquinas certainly
believed in God, he was perhaps more sensitive to the possible ob-
jections of the adversaries than was Anselm.
On the other hand, Anselm, while explicitly mentioning the Fool
of the Psalm, who says in his heart “There is no God”,38 nevertheless
addresses himself to God in prayer, not to the Fool.39 He makes God
his primary audience: the reader feels that he is overhearing the prayer
of a believer who is not prepared to discard his belief if he does not
find rational proof for it. Anselm is evidently operating within the
35 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles I, 11.
36 See Gareth Matthews, ‘Aquinas on Saying God Doesn’t Exist’, The Monist 47 (1963)
p. 473.
37 Thomas Aquinas’ refutation can be seen in his Summa theologiae I, 2, 1, 2.
38 Ps 14 (13), 1.
39 Karl Barth, too, has claimed that Anselm was not intending to argue against the
atheist. (See Dayton Haskin, ‘The Ontological Argument and Theological Education’, New
Blackfriars 54 [1973] p. 150.)
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Augustinian tradition in an era where no careful distinction between
philosophy and theology was made. His proof only confirmed that
of which he was already convinced.
Aquinas also objects to Anselm’s conclusion that the Fool cannot
deny God’s existence without contradiction. He distinguishes between
something being self-evident in itself, and its being self-evident to
us. Philosophically God is reached only through reasoning based on
the existence of sensible things in themselves:
I maintain then that the proposition ‘God exists’ is self-evident in
itself for, . . . its subject and predicate are identical, since God is his
own existence. But, because what it is to be God is not evident to
us, the proposition is not self-evident to us, and needs to be made
evident. This is done by means of things which, though less evident
in themselves, are nevertheless more evident to us, by means, namely,
of God’s effects . . . It is self-evident that there exists truth in general,
but it is not self-evident to us that there exists a First Truth.40
It is interesting to note that Anselm would probably agree with
Thomas Aquinas’s last point. He would have held that it is only
with the help of the light of God, which enlightens the human mind,
that one can understand that God’s existence is necessary. Just as
Augustine argued that “The hidden things and secrets of the King-
dom of God first seek out believing men that they may make them
understand. For faith is understanding’s ladder, and understanding
is faith’s reward”,41 Anselm speaks of the “ladder of faith”.42 For
Anselm, God is inaccessible light and yet provides the very context
and precondition of our seeing. He maintained, along Augustinian
lines, that eternal truth illuminates human intellects, rendering them
certain and infallible. Thomas does not agree. He holds that there
is nothing eternal in the human intellect: “since the divine intellect
alone is eternal, truth has eternity in it alone”.43 Thus, the perception
and the enunciation of truth by the human intellect is always nec-
essarily historical, changeable, perfectible and fallible. This is even
more the case when one considers the fundamental truths such as
those regarding God and the soul.
The marked divergence between Anselm and Thomas derives
from a divergence in feeling which lies in that the one is turned to
the contemplation of the infinite intelligibility from which all truth
proceeds, while the other concentrates on the question of a finite
intellect working among the finite effects of a cause that exceeds its
40 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, 2, 1.
41 Augustine, Sermo CXXVI, 1, 1.
42 See Anselm, De Incarnation Verbi, 1.
43 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i, 16, 7 : Summa theologiae, edited by Thomas
Gilby and others, iv, (Cambridge: Blackfriars 1964), p. 93.
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understanding.44 This ancient debate between the two philosophers
has been extended into contemporary times. For instance, Donald
Davidson argues, on the one hand, that ‘truth’ enters the world with
successful knowers or, as he puts it: “Nothing in the world, no object
or event, would be true or false if there were not thinking creatures”.45
On the other hand, we have proponents of the Augustinian-Anselmian
tradition such as John Zizioulas who speaks of the truth in terms of
‘that which is’. The latter asks: “How can a Christian hold to the
idea that truth operates in history and creation when the ultimate
character of truth, and its uniqueness, seem irreconcilable with the
change and decay to which history and creation are subject?”46
Perhaps it would be instructive, at this point, to recall that, while
it may not seem too evident that Karl Rahner’s epistemological and
metaphysical lines lie parallel to Anselm’s – after all Rahner was in
dialogue with Aquinas, not Anselm – there are a number of similar
points that bear further elucidation.
The first concerns Rahner’s postulation of the unity of being and
knowing. His metaphysics and epistemology lead him to assert that,
in the activity of human questioning, a questioning that inevitably
raises the implicit and primordial question of Being, Being reveals
itself as luminous self-presence. This does not exactly mean that
Being is clearly self-evident:
. . . What being is, is not always obvious. We know of it (‘bekannt’)
but we do not really know it (‘erkannt’). Although we know of being,
our question is not a rhetorical one. We ask it, because we do not
yet really know what we are inquiring about. Finally our question
always makes a distinction between being and beings. It is precisely
this which enables us to inquire about being. We know of beings, we
know beings, we have continually to do with them, our knowledge
refers to them. But we do not know what the being of these beings is.
That is why we inquire.47
He argues that: “Knowledge is the self-presence of Being and this
self-presence is the being of any entity”.48 Now, being is knowledge
44 See Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, ‘Truth: Anselm or Aquinas’, New Black-
friars 66 (1985) p. 86.
45 Donald Davidson, ‘The Structure and Content of Truth’, The Journal of Philosophy
87 (1990) p. 279.
46 John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church,
(London: DLT, 1985), p. 70.
47 Karl Rahner, Hearer of the Word, translated by Joseph Donceel, (New York: Contin-
uum, 1994), p. 28. This translation contains an error in the first sentence quoted above and
reads: “What being is, is always obvious”. This error has been corrected in the quotation
from the same translation in A Rahner Reader, edited by Gerald A. McCool, (Pittsburgh:
Pickwick Press, 1975), p. 6.
48 As quoted in Peter Serracino Inglott, Beginning Philosophy, (Malta: Media Centre,
1987), p. 202.
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or truth only to the extent that being is or has Being. For, Rahner, in
rejecting an idealist, panentheistic interpretation of the unity of Be-
ing and knowing (or what he calls the ‘self-luminosity’ of Being49),
maintains that ‘Being’ is an analogous concept. This, of course, is
a quintessentially Thomistic perspective. However, his exact inter-
pretation appears to locate knowledge or truth50 in the degree of
self-possession an existent enjoys. At any rate, there is very little
scope for truth as the fruit of a relation between the intellect and the
thing known or at least, this relationship is quite different from the
Angelic Doctor’s:
We must . . . start from this: that being is of and by itself knowing and
being known, that being is self-presence . . . The complete ontic reality
of the intellect is that which is actually known. Since this statement
refers to the essence, it is also reversible: in order to be actually
known, that which is knowable must basically be the ontic reality of
the intellect itself . . . something is known to the extent that it becomes
in its being identical with the knowing subject.51
Moreover, Rahner holds that intelligibility does not ‘develop’ in
being from without; it does not consist only in a relation that is
extrinsic to the being itself or in some knowledge that happens to
grasp the being in question. He believes that intelligibility belongs
intrinsically to the very nature of the being in question: when one
affirms being, being is always already expressing itself. Every being
has, on account of its very being an “inner ordination to possible
knowledge and so to a possible knower”.52 Intelligibility belongs to
the essence of every being.
This principle is based on the original and fundamental concept of
being from which all other objects of knowledge are but derivations:
actual being or esse. This original unity of knowable and knowing
implies that the intellect and the object have the same origin; in
Thomist terms: the intellect and that which is intelligible in act are
one.53 Thus, being is, in itself, knowing and knowing is nothing
else than the self-presence of being that is inseparable from its very
make-up. Knowledge is self-possession or self-presence; being is self-
luminosity.
Rahner also argues that one’s interpretation of the Angelic Doctor’s
epistemology would be extremely shallow if one were to interpret the
49 See Karl Rahner, Hearer of the Word, translated by Joseph Donceel, (New York:
Continuum, 1994), p. 30.
50 See Ibid., pp. 39–40, where Rahner equates ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’.
51 Ibid., p. 32.
52 Ibid., p. 29.
53
“Cum intellectus et intelligibile in actu sint unum”. (Thomas Aquinas, In Metaph.
Prooem., in Karl Rahner, Hearer of the Word, translated by Joseph Donceel, [New York:
Continuum, 1994], p. 31.)
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unity of the knowing and the knowable as if it simply meant that the
known as such must be known to some knower; that the knower must
know something and that it is in this sense that both must be one.
For him, what Thomas really means is that, that which is knowable
is basically the ontic reality of the intellect itself.54
Thus, in Rahner’s interpretation of Thomas, there is no distance
or gap between the knower and the known. The intellect and that
which is intelligible in act are one. Knowledge essentially takes place
through the return of the knowing subject into him/her self. This
possibility of ‘reditio in se ipsum,’ in turn, is the basic constituent
in being.55 It belongs to the basic constitution of the human person
that s/he that not only can s/he inquire about being but that s/he
must do so. The human person is not absolute consciousness; s/he
is a finite spirit. It is only the pure act of being that is the absolute
identity of Being and knowing; it is only that which possesses itself
in pure luminosity. However, the more a human person knows and
wills, the more s/he draws back into him/herself and the more s/he
becomes present to him/herself and, concomitantly, the more s/he
places him/her self in the presence of Absolute Being. The real and
primordial object of knowledge is the knower him/her self:
The degree of self-presence, of luminosity for oneself, corresponds to
the intensity of being, to the degree in which being belongs to some
existent, to the degree in which, notwithstanding its non-being, a being
shares in being. And the other way round: the degree of intensity of
being shows in the degree in which the being in question is able to
return into itself, in which it is capable, by reflecting upon itself, to
be luminous for itself.56
Also, Rahner maintains that the union of knower and known in the
human person’s act of knowledge demands their prior identity in Ab-
solute Being as the condition of its possibility. In this regard, Rahner
understands the relation between the intellect and the thing known in
a very different manner from that envisaged by Aquinas;57 in fact he
may be said to give a somewhat Anselmian interpretation to Aquinas’
vision. For, his understanding of intelligibility and knowledge is an
54 See Karl Rahner, Hearer of the Word, translated by Joseph Donceel, (New York:
Continuum, 1994), p. 32.
55 The problem Rahner sees in Thomistic epistemology lies rather in the direction of
how the known, which is originally identical with the knower can stand in a relation of
otherness. Rahner considers the answer to lie in his postulation of the ‘Vorgriff ’ towards
being as illimited in itself, which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of an
object known as object.
56 Karl Rahner, Hearer of the Word, translated by Joseph Donceel, (New York: Con-
tinuum, 1994), p. 37.
57 Even if Rahner’s interpretation of Aquinas is to some extent correct, his perspective
from a post-Cartesian point of view was vastly influenced by Kantianism and is very
different from that of the Angelic Doctor’s.
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almost exclusively transcendental one which gets intelligibility into
things and knowledge into intellects by deriving both rather hastily
from the esse actu or summa veritas, which is God.
This epistemological and metaphysical idea is an extremely al-
luring one and it produces abundant fruit in Rahner’s philosophico-
theological system. For instance, in the ‘Vorgriff ’ as the necessity that
drives the human person to anticipate being as such, the existence of
an absolute being (hence of God) is always co-affirmed, even though
not categorially represented. The ‘Vorgriff ’ affirms Absolute Being
as real and, in this sense, one may say that the ‘Vorgriff ’ aims at
God. Rahner does maintain that this is not an a priori demonstration
of God, like that of Augustine, Anselm or Leibniz for the ‘Vorgriff ’
and that its range could only be known and be affirmed in the a pos-
teriori knowledge of a real being and as the necessary condition of
this knowledge.58 However, whereas Thomas holds that the concept
of God comes last in all our knowledge, Rahner’s ‘Vorgriff ’ implies
that in every act of knowledge God is already implicitly known as
the previous condition of that knowledge.59
Like Anselm, Rahner is not careful enough in his distinction be-
tween philosophy and theology. Something being self-evident in itself
is not necessarily self-evident to the human person. Like Anselm’s,
Rahner’s demonstration (while derived from a posteriori experience)
depends on inner individualist-mentalist experience. In rather the
same Platonic-Augustinian line as Anselm, Rahner seems to present
thinking as inconceivable except as a participation in being and as
an interpretation of being. The ancient idea of the illumination of the
soul by God appears to lurk behind Rahner’s metaphysical epistemol-
ogy as related to the idea that the image of God in the interior of the
human person is the locus where God directly manifests Godself. In
a similar way to Anselm’s presentation of his celebrated argument,
Rahner presents his idea of the ‘Vorgriff ’ as the condition of the
possibility of all knowledge of objects and all human action (Anselm
might be said to have presented the concept of God as the supreme
idea that is required for thinking and in which thinking transcends
itself). Like Anselm’s argument, Rahner’s understanding of the ‘Vor-
griff ’ and of the ‘supernatural existential’ might well be dismissed
58 Rahner maintains that his understanding of the knowledge of God is but a new trans-
lation of the traditional Thomist ways demonstrating the existence of God. The translation
takes place from the language of the metaphysics of being to that of the metaphysics of
knowledge. (See Karl Rahner, Hearer of the Word, translated by Joseph Donceel, [New
York: Continuum, 1994], p. 51.)
59 This is also held by Aquinas who also argues that in every act of knowledge we
implicitly know God (See Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate XXII, 2 ad 1). However, Aquinas
is much more mindful of the limitations of human knowledge: he maintains that what is
self-evident in itself is not necessarily self-evident to the human person.
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by the modern thinker for much the same reasons as the ontological
argument was rejected by Kant.60
Rahner and Anselm both assume that the being, to whose existence
their respective methods lead is to be identified with the Christian
God: this leap, once again blurs the distinction between philosophy
and theology for there is a difference between the usage of the
term ‘God’ as a general term and its usage as a proper name. The
non-conceptual, pre-thematic postulation of an ultimate, absolute or
infinite61 or the experience of the dynamic movement of thought
beyond itself makes no explicit reference to an object: there is no
explicit answer to the implied ‘whence’ of the experience.62 Clearly,
however, both Anselm and Rahner think that the experiences to which
they appeal necessarily give rise to explicit beliefs. They would argue
that the experiences and the beliefs are inseparable.
In conclusion, one must say that Anselm’s philosophy is an attempt
to circumvent the need for finite things in an attempt to arrive directly
at the one, subsistent, eternal truth that is in God and that is God.
It reflects the aspiration for perfect, eternal knowledge, the drive to
rise above that which is merely human. It holds fast to the ideal of
the knower being disengaged from human sensory and intellectual
limitations, and social and historical contingency, and thus free to
see reality objectively.63
60 Descartes’ classic defence of the Ontological Argument had some important critics,
but the most invoked criticism was offered by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure
Reason. Kant rejected the argument on two bases: First, leaving the argument’s presup-
positions unchallenged for the moment, he grants the analytic connections Descartes had
asserted between the concept of God and that of existence. Therefore in the proposition ‘a
perfect Being exists’, one could not affirm the subject and reject the predicate. However,
one could choose not to affirm both the subject and the predicate without contradiction i.e.
to reject as a whole the concept of an existing all-perfect Being. Secondly, Kant rejects the
assumption that existence is a real predicate (if it were a real and not merely a grammatical
predicate, it would be able to form part of the definition of God, and it would therefore be
an analytic fact that God exists) on the grounds that propositions asserting existence are
always true or false as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of definition. The function
of ‘is’ or ‘exists’ is not to add to the content of a concept, but to lay down a real object
answering to a concept. Thus the real contains no more than the imaginary (a hundred real
dollars are the same in number as a hundred imagined ones); the difference is that in one
case the concept does, and in the other the object does not correspond to reality.
61 Anselm too would argue along these lines, for the idea of God he embraces is the
point at which thinking necessarily transcends itself and thinks something it is incapable
of thinking out any further because the infinite is incapable of being captured in any finite
concept.
62 See Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke,
1989), Part I. It is, however, difficult to conceive of the possibility of such experiences as
Rahner and Anselm point to as being linked to some term in the sense of being experiences
‘of’ something or ‘about’ something.
63 See Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers, I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), p. 112.
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While he did not furnish a conclusive proof of the necessary ex-
istence of God, Anselm’s argument shows how the question of the
existence of God is one and the same with the question of the in-
telligibility and coherence of God and with the question of the in-
telligibility and coherence of reality; in discussing the possibility of
such talk, one is discussing the possibility of the existence of God.
This is, perhaps, Anselm’s greatest achievement in his argument: he
demonstrated, albeit inadvertently, how and why the question of the
existence of the theist God is also a logical problem, a problem that
lies at the heart of man’s search for truth.
Mark Sultana
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